Abstract Markov chains (stochastic processes where probabilities are assigned based on the previous outcome) are commonly used to examine the transitions between behavioral states, such as those that occur during foraging or social interactions. However, relatively little is known about how well primates can incorporate knowledge about Markov chains into their behavior. Saccadic eye movements are an example of a simple behavior inXuenced by information about probability, and thus are good candidates for testing whether subjects can learn Markov chains. In addition, when investigating the inXuence of probability on saccade target selection, the use of Markov chains could provide an alternative method that avoids confounds present in other task designs. To investigate these possibilities, we evaluated human behavior on a task in which stimulus reward probabilities were assigned using a Markov chain. On each trial, the subject selected one of four identical stimuli by saccade; after selection, feedback indicated the rewarded stimulus. Each session consisted of 200-600 trials, and on some sessions, the reward magnitude varied. On sessions with a uniform reward, subjects (n = 6) learned to select stimuli at a frequency close to reward probability, which is similar to human behavior on matching or probability classiWcation tasks. When informed that a Markov chain assigned reward probabilities, subjects (n = 3) learned to select the greatest reward probability more often, bringing them close to behavior that maximizes reward. On sessions where reward magnitude varied across stimuli, subjects (n = 6) demonstrated preferences for both greater reward probability and greater reward magnitude, resulting in a preference for greater expected value (the product of reward probability and magnitude). These results demonstrate that Markov chains can be used to dynamically assign probabilities that are rapidly exploited by human subjects during saccade target selection.
Introduction
Markov chains are stochastic processes in which probabilities are assigned based on the previous outcome. Because of their ability to describe complex sequences of events, Markov chains have many applications, ranging from machine learning to modeling population growth. Of particular interest, Markov chain analysis is one of the key methods used to understand transitions between bouts of behavior in individuals as well as transitions in social dynamics (MacDonald et al. 2000) . For example, a simple Markov chain model, in which foraging behavior depends upon the level of satiation, has been used to explain why many animals, including primates, spend more time resting than foraging (Herbers 1981) . Learning based on Markov chains may be particularly important to social primates because it would allow them to infer the likely behavior of other animals based on observation of their current status. A series of experiments (Kornblum 1968 (Kornblum , 1969 used Markov chains to manipulate target probabilities for manual responses, in which humans were explicitly informed about the underlying statistical structure. However, little is known about how well humans infer Markovian structure from a sequence of outcomes.
A strong candidate behavior for testing how well primates learn from Markov chains are voluntary saccadic eye movements. A variety of factors inXuence voluntary saccades. Basic visual properties like spatial contrast can make parts of a scene more likely to be the target of a saccade (Reinagel and Zador 1999; Peters et al. 2005) . Nevertheless, top-down or cognitive factors also inXuence voluntary eye movements. For instance, in the well-known studies of Yarbus (1967) , subjects' scan paths were very diVerent when assessing disparate features of the painting such as the wealth of the Wgures versus their age.
Recent studies have identiWed several top-down factors that can inXuence saccade preparation, including estimates of target probability (Carpenter and Williams 1995; Dorris and Munoz 1998) , reward magnitude (Kawagoe et al. 1998; Ikeda and Hikosaka 2003) , and expected value (Milstein and Dorris 2007) . Moreover, neural activity correlated with target probability has been observed in brain regions involved in generating saccades (e.g. Basso and Wurtz 1998; Dorris and Munoz 1998; Platt and Glimcher 1999) .
In most cases, manipulation of target probability is related to some other variable that could be responsible for eVects on saccade reaction time or physiological recordings. One confounding factor is that grouping trials into lengthy blocks with an identical probability distribution (e.g. Carpenter and Williams 1995; Dorris and Munoz 1998) makes target probability directly related to the frequency of target repetitions. This is a problem because target repetitions inXuence saccade preparation even when there is no accompanying change in target probability (Dorris et al. 2000; Fecteau and Munoz 2003) . Although it is possible that repetition eVects are driven entirely by empirical estimates of local target probability by the subject, other factors, like motor priming (Hackley and Valle-Inclan 2003) , might be responsible for repetition eVects on saccade preparation. Another confounding factor is that changing the number of potential targets in a visual scene may alter saccade preparation because of bottom-up changes in visual processing rather than the top-down inXuence of target probability. These sensory eVects can be controlled by presenting blocks of trials with the same stimuli and probability distribution, but this solution reintroduces the problems caused by repetition eVects.
Thus, although there is abundant evidence for top-down inXuences in saccade preparation, it is not clear from previous studies whether saccade selection can be inXuenced by probabilities governed by stochastic processes like Markov chains. Furthermore, Markov chains provide a potential technique to eliminate the confounds present in other task designs, because they can be used to control probability dynamically on a trial-by-trial basis instead of using an identical probability distribution for each trial.
In the following experiments, we assessed how well humans learn stimulus reward probabilities from a saccade selection task in which the probabilities were assigned by a Markov chain. On some sessions, we also examined the interactions between reward probabilities and reward magnitudes by varying the size of the reward depending on the location of the stimulus.
Methods

Subjects
Six naïve adult human subjects participated in these experiments (three women and three men, 22-36 years of age). Subjects gave their written informed consent, and all procedures were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board. Each subject participated in seven to eight sessions, the Wrst of which was a training session, and most sessions were close to 600 trials long.
General procedures
Subjects sat in a dark room 41 cm from a computer monitor displaying stimuli at a 75-Hz frame rate. Head movements were minimized using a bite-bar, and eye movements were sampled at 240 Hz using a video-based eye tracker (Iscan, Burlington, MA, USA). Experimental control and data acquisition were performed by Tempo software package (ReXective Computing, St Louis, MO, USA), and stimuli were presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard 1997; Pelli 1997 ) extensions for Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA).
Markov tasks
Subjects performed a saccade selection task among four identical stimuli. The temporal sequence of stimuli presentation during two experimental trials is illustrated in Fig. 1a . Subjects began each trial by Wxating a central 0.5 £ 0.5° spot for a randomized 200-400 ms interval. Eye position was monitored to conWrm that subjects maintained Wxation within 3° of the central stimulus. After Wxation, the central spot disappeared with simultaneous appearance of four identical choice stimuli (discs of 0.4° radius evenly spaced at an eccentricity of 7° from Wxation). After onset of the four stimuli, subjects made a saccade directly to the stimulus location of their choice and were required to Wxate the stimulus to an accuracy of 3° for 200 ms. Following selection, the central Wxation spot reappeared, and upon returning to the Wxation spot, subjects were given visual and auditory feedback about their choice. Visual feedback consisted of an image of a coin presented at the rewarded location with a number indicating the monetary award (in cents) for that trial; auditory feedback consisted of a 1-s tone that indicated whether the choice for that trial was correct (100 Hz incorrect, 200 Hz correct). A correct choice meant that the subject selected the rewarded location, and only one stimulus location was rewarded on each trial. This location was drawn from a uniform probability distribution, and subsequent rewarded locations were assigned by a Markov chain. On each trial, the rewarded location was drawn according to one of four probability distributions, each of which depended on the rewarded location of the previous trial (i.e., the state of the Markov chain). Thus, the rewarded location on each trial transitioned between trials, and the transition probabilities formed a four by four contingency table such as the one shown in Fig. 1b .
Subjects received speciWc instructions before participating in the task. First, subjects were shown a schematic of the task, similar to Fig. 1a , to generally indicate how they should orient their gaze during each epoch of the task. Second, subjects read the following instructions about what to do during the selection epoch: "On each trial, only one stimulus will have a reward. Shift your gaze to the stimulus that you think is most likely to be rewarded."
Subjects were run under two conditions. In the "uniform-reward" condition, correct selections to any of the choice stimuli yielded a uniform 4-cent reward. In the "varying-reward" condition, correct selections of the choice stimuli yielded a reward magnitude of 1, 2, 6, or 8 cents, dependent only on the location of the choice stimulus. The assigned magnitudes remained stationary for entire sessions and were revealed before the start of each session by displaying coins with numbers indicating the monetary award at each location; the same coins were also used to indicate the rewarded location during the visual feedback of each trial. Subjects were paid the greater of their accumulated reward total or ten dollars for each session.
Contingency tables for each session, each describing the transition probabilities of a Markov chain, were constructed in Matlab with several constraints. For all uniform-reward experiments, the four stimulus locations were assigned probabilities of 0.0136, 0.0915, 0.2791, and 0.6157, regardless of the Markov state. However, each Markov state assigned each probability to a diVerent location (e.g. see Fig. 1b ). For all varying-reward experiments, the four stimulus locations were assigned probabilities of 0.0444, 0.1494, 0.3037, and 0.5025. The smallest reward probability was always assigned to the previously rewarded stimulus to prevent long strings of the same rewarded stimulus. In addition, the probabilities were assigned so that each location would be rewarded with a probability of 0.25. For each subject, by shuZing the transition probabilities, we ensured that no two sessions shared identical contingency tables.
After the third session of the uniform-reward task, Wve of six subjects were asked to describe, by written statement or diagram, their strategy for making selections during the task.
Analyses
Saccades were detected using eye velocity and acceleration criteria (velocity >35° per s, acceleration >700° per s 2 ) and conWrmed by visual inspection (Krauzlis and Miles 1996) . Saccadic reaction times for each trial were deWned as the diVerence between the time of Wxation spot oVset and the time of saccade initiation. Saccade selections for analyses Following Wxation of a white spot, subjects were given, up to 1 s, to initiate a saccade directly to the stimulus of their choice. Upon oVset of the choice stimuli, subjects returned to Wxation, which triggered visual feedback of the reward location and magnitude and auditory feedback indicating whether they selected the rewarded stimulus. A blank screen marked transition to the next trial. Sessions were comprised of at least 200 trials and typically lasted from 500 to 600 trials. Because stimuli were identical, subjects could only determine the next stimulus by using estimates of reward probability. b A sample probability distribution and Markov chain. The stimulus diagram on the right shows the reward probabilities of each stimulus location for a trial following a reward at location 1. The full structure of the Markov chain is given by the accompanying contingency table, which provides the reward probabilities for trials following a reward at any of the four locations. The probabilities were assigned such that each stimulus location had a reward probability of 0.25 over the course of a session A B were determined by calculating the closest stimulus to the saccade end point.
To determine how quickly performance, on average, improved to better than chance, binomial distributions were Wt to the fraction of correct selections binned across sessions for each trial, and we determined the Wrst trial which was signiWcantly greater than performance expected by chance. To determine if subject performance improved across sessions, binomial distributions were also used to describe the fraction of correct selections binned across the Wrst and Wnal 100 trials of each session; no signiWcant diVerences in performance were found between these epochs, so full data sets were used for analyses. As described in the results, in an additional set of experiments we informed naïve subjects that a Markov chain assigned reward probabilities; signiWcant improvements in the fraction of correct selections between the Wrst and Wnal 100 trials were found for the "informed" subjects, so only the last 100 trials were used for further analyses.
For each session, correlation between reward probabilities and the fraction of subject selections of each reward probability were calculated, and a bootstrap procedure using 1,000 replicates was used to test signiWcance (Efron and Tibshirani 1998) . A Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to determine if subjects made signiWcantly more selections of the greatest reward probability in sessions after they were informed than in sessions when they were naïve. A chi-square goodness of Wt was used to test if selections were signiWcantly diVerent from a uniform distribution.
To test for signiWcant eVects of reward probability on saccade reaction times, one-way ANOVAs were performed separately for each subject with saccade reaction times grouped by reward probability. The data set for each subject included all uniform-reward session where the subject was naïve about the Markov task. Correlation coeYcients between reward probability and mean saccade reaction times were also calculated, and a bootstrap procedure, as described above, was used to test for signiWcance.
Statistical dependence between subject selections and Markov states was assessed by estimating mutual information (Cover and Thomas 1991) , and conWdence intervals for mutual information were constructed by a bootstrap procedure. Statistical dependence expected by chance was calculated by estimating mutual information after scrambling the relationship between Markov states and subject selections; this was done 1,000 times for each session, and the resulting distributions were used to calculate a one-tailed 95% conWdence interval. A Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to compare the mutual information content of all sessions with naïve subjects to the mutual information content of all sessions with informed subjects.
To test if subjects improved their reward accumulation over the course of varying-reward sessions, we compared the accumulated reward in the Wrst and Wnal 100 trials of each session, again using a bootstrap procedure. Full datasets were used for further analyses when no signiWcant change in performance within a session was found. If a signiWcant diVerence in performance was observed, only the latter half of the session was used for calculating the fraction of trials selected by reward probability, reward magnitude, and expected value (the product of reward probability and magnitude). A Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to assess whether the numbers of choices related to reward probability, reward magnitude and expected value were signiWcantly diVerent from each other.
Results
The reward probabilities assigned by the Markov chains consistently and signiWcantly inXuenced the distribution of saccade selections with no consistent eVect on saccade reaction time (see Table 1 ). Therefore the rest of the "Results" section focuses on examining the subjects' choice behavior.
The time-course of learning from a Markov chain For the uniform-reward experiment, in which reward probabilities were assigned by the Markov state but reward magnitudes were uniform across all stimuli, individual sessions indicated that subjects made use of the underlying Markov statistics when selecting targets. Figure 2a , plots the locations of the Wrst 200 selected stimuli of a typical session for two subjects. The Markov chains were designed so that each stimulus location would be rewarded with a probability of 0.25. Accordingly, subjects exhibited no obvious pattern of preference for particular stimulus locations. However, sorting the subject selections by reward probability, shown in Fig. 2b , reveals a preference for higher reward probabilities. Figure 2c illustrates how well subjects accumulated rewards over the course of the sample session by plotting the fraction of correct (rewarded) selections in a running boxcar of 20 trials. Within the Wrst 20 trials, the fraction correct rises above the 0.25 value, expected by chance, and remains elevated throughout most of the session.
To examine the course of learning at the timescale of a few trials, we calculated the fraction of correct selections across all uniform-reward sessions for all subjects. Figure 3a shows the fraction of correct selections in bins of four trials, with 95% one-tailed conWdence intervals, and Fig. 3b provides a closer view of the Wrst 30 trials. By the second bin of four trials, subject performance was signiWcantly above the 0.25 fraction correct expected by chance, and remained signiWcant for most of the subsequent trials.
Thus, learning from the Markov chains in our task occurred very quickly.
In contrast to the rapid learning observed at the start of a session, there was no signiWcant improvement in subject performance over the rest of the session. Figure 4 quantiWes performance for each of the six subjects by plotting the fraction of correct selections in a running boxcar over the course of each session (three sessions per subject). As expected by the rapid improvement of performance shown in Fig. 3 , the fraction of correct selections for each session was signiWcantly greater than the fraction correct expected by chance (P < 0.05). However, subject performance remained fairly steady over the course of individual sessions. After the initial rapid learning, there were no signiWcant changes in the fraction of correct selections between the beginning and the end of a session for any of the subjects (comparison of binomial distributions of the Wrst 100 trials and last 100 trials, P > 0.05 for all sessions). Due to the absence of signiWcant changes in performance beyond the rapid improvement at the start of each session, all trials from each session were pooled for subsequent analyses. Fig. 2c A B
How the Markov chains inXuenced saccade selections
The clearest evidence that the Markov structure inXuenced saccade selections is the consistent preference for stimuli assigned high reward probabilities. Figure 5a shows the mean fraction of subject selections by location for each subject. Although subjects did not select each location an equal number of times (P < 0.05 for 14/18 sessions), their preference for particular locations did not improve their fraction of rewarded selections. In contrast, Fig. 5b demonstrates that, on average, subjects had a monotonically increasing preference for increasing probabilities of reward. Analysis of individual sessions revealed signiWcant correlations between reward probability and fraction of subject selections (P < 0.05 for all sessions, smallest correlation 0.52, mean correlation 0.90). Subject preference for stimuli with greater reward probabilities can only be explained by subjects conditioning their selections on the Markov state. Another clear piece of evidence that the Markov chains inXuenced saccades selections is that, after performing the task, subjects were able to report the contingencies in the task. Upon completing their third session of the uniformreward task, Wve of the six subjects were asked to describe their strategy in making selections. Subjects tended to describe their strategies in terms of the reward transitioning from one location to another on a trial-by-trial basis, indicating knowledge that the previously rewarded location was important for determining the next rewarded location. For example, one of the subjects drew a diagram of the four choice stimuli with arrows indicating their preferred selection following a reward at each stimulus. Four of the Wve subjects identiWed the stimulus most likely to be rewarded following each Markov state; the other subject identiWed three of the four. All subjects also described idiosyncratic strategies. For example, one subject reported, "I noted that occasionally it would go across, so I occasionally went across, but I could not predict when." In general, the selfreports indicate that subjects employed strategies that drew on knowledge of the Markov chains as well as incidental patterns observed during the session.
Despite the use of the underlying Markov statistics, most subjects did not approach a strategy that maximized reward. One possible reason for this outcome is that the stochastic draws from the Markov chain did not provide enough evidence for an observer to infer the greatest reward probability over the course of a session. However this is contradicted by the subjects' ability to verbally report which stimulus was most likely to be rewarded following each Markov state. Moreover, by 100 trials, for every Markov state, the stimulus with greatest reward probability was indeed the most rewarded stimulus. Another possible reason is that subjects never learned to construct a completely Markovian model for guiding their selections; this explanation is consistent with subject descriptions of idiosyncratic strategies. To further test for this possibility, three subjects performed another uniform-reward session after being informed about Markov models and that rewards in the task were assigned by a Markov chain (without revealing the particular contingency table used). In contrast to their performance when they were naïve about the underlying Markov structure, informed subjects made signiWcantly more correct selections over the entire course of each session (comparison of binomial distributions of the Wrst 100 trials and last 100 trials, P < 0.05 for all sessions). Complimentary to improvements in performance, Fig. 5c shows that informed subjects selected the stimulus with greatest reward probability more often than when naïve (Wilcoxon, P < 0.01).
We quantiWed the degree to which subjects used the underlying Markov chains to guide saccade selections by estimating mutual information. If subjects were guiding their decisions by the Markov state, as subject performance suggests, then there should be a signiWcant amount of mutual information between the Markov states and subject selections. Figure 6 shows the mutual information for each session. In this four-alternative forced-choice task, 2 bits of information would completely account for subject selections, and less than 0.05 bit of information was expected by chance for any given session. We found that the Markov state provided a mean of 0.55 bits of information about subject selections. A statistical dependence of 0.55 bits is consistent with a subject preference for higher reward probabilities, based on the Markov state, while sometimes still selecting smaller reward probabilities. After being informed that reward probabilities were assigned by a Markov chain (Fig. 6 , dark gray bars), subjects had signiWcantly more mutual information than their best session while naïve (comparison of distributions from bootstrap, P < 0.05). Informed subjects also had signiWcantly more mutual information than the population of naïve subjects (Wilcoxon, P < 0.05) with a mean of 1.1 bits across all three sessions, indicating a stronger relationship between Markov state and saccade selection.
Interactions between reward probability and magnitude Subjects accumulated more reward than expected by chance during varying-reward sessions, in which each stimulus location had a diVerent reward magnitude of 1, 2, 6, or 8 cents. Figure 7 displays a running boxcar of the reward accumulated over the previous 50 trials for each session, sorted by subject. Once again, every subject on every session accumulated more reward than expected by chance (P < 0.05), whereas generally they did not show signiWcant improvement in performance past the Wrst 100 trials of a session (comparison of bootstrapped distributions, 14/18 sessions, P > 0.05). The collection of more reward than expected by chance could be from a selection preference for greater reward magnitude, greater reward probability, or greater expected value (the product of reward probability and magnitude).
Saccade selections from varying-reward sessions show that subjects improved reward accumulation by combining reward probability and magnitude. Figure 8a -c summarizes all subject selections for varying reward sessions sorted by reward probability (a), reward magnitude (b), and expected value (c). Whereas subjects favored greater reward probabilities, reward magnitudes, and expected values, on most trials, these factors are confounded because the stimulus with the greatest expected value usually also had the greatest reward probability or magnitude (or both). However, The mean distribution of saccade selections for each naïve subject (three sessions per subject) by a stimulus location and b stimulus reward probability. The bar plot indicates the mean of all sessions combined. c The distribution of saccade selections for three subjects after being informed that reward probabilities were assigned by a Markov chain A B C Fig. 6 Mutual information between selections and Markov states. The estimate for mutual information between subject selections and Markov states is given for each session, sorted by subject. Sessions are plotted in chronological order, and dark gray bars are given for subjects that completed a fourth session after being informed that reward probabilities were assigned by a Markov chain. Error bars show the 95% conWdence intervals calculated by bootstrap (see "Methods"). Maximum information for a four alternative forced choice task is 2 bits. The dashed black line indicates the largest 95% conWdence interval of the mutual information expected by chance from all of the sessions shown there was a subset of trials in which the greatest reward probability, reward magnitude, and expected value were assigned to diVerent stimuli. This subset of trials, referred to as "conXicting trials" and summarized in Fig. 8d -f, demonstrates that subjects selected the greatest expected value (f) signiWcantly more often than either the greatest reward probability (d) (Wilcoxon, P < 0.0001) or the greatest reward magnitude (e) (P < 0.0001). Thus subjects were willing to sacriWce selection of the greatest reward probability and the greatest reward magnitude in order to accumulate more reward by selecting the greatest expected value most often.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that human subjects can take advantage of the statistical structure of a Markov chain during a saccade selection task, even when naïve to the existence of the underlying Markov chain. The clearest evidence is provided by our observation that distributions of saccade selections were signiWcantly correlated with stimulus reward probabilities. We also measured statistical dependence between Markov state (or previous outcome) and the subsequent saccade selection, indicating the extent to which subjects incorporated the Markov structure into their decisions. Whereas naïve subjects take partial advantage of Markovian structure in order to improve performance, they beneWted more after being informed that the probabilities comprised a Markov chain. Informed subjects selected the greatest reward probability signiWcantly more often than naïve subjects, and had a stronger statistical dependence between Markov state and saccade selection. Naïve subjects tended to adopt strategies that did not maximize reward accumulation. This result is consistent with an extensive literature of suboptimal human performance on manual free choice tasks in which probabilities are assigned independently between trials (reviewed by Vulkan 2000) , and probability classiWcation tasks (Gluck and Bower 1998; Knowlton et al. 1994; Gluck et al. 2002) . One possible reason subjects did not reach optimal performance is that they may have used a poor model to guide their saccade selections. We tested this possibility by having several subjects perform the same task after they were informed that a Markov chain assigned reward probabilities. The informed subjects improved their performance over hundreds of trials and approached a strategy that maximized reward accumulation. This outcome provides evidence that naïve subjects used incorrect models to guide their selections. Nevertheless, even informed subjects did not always select the greatest reward probability, indicating that some other factor, such as motivation or uncertainty of probability, also limited subject performance.
Although naïve subjects did not tend to adopt maximal strategies, they did manage to take advantage of the Markov chain very quickly (within ten trials) in order to improve performance. Such learning is feasible within very few trials so long as subjects immediately viewed the location of previous rewards as a salient cue to guide selections, and they largely based their selections from the small number of observed transitions in reward location. It is well documented, and perhaps unsurprising, that humans would treat a small sample of transitions as representative of future transitions (Tversky and Kahneman 1971) . It is more surprising that subjects would so quickly view the transitions in reward locations as an important factor in performing the task. The fast learning indicates that Markov structures are salient environmental features for shaping human behavior.
The post-experiment reports from the naïve subjects indicate that there was an explicit component to their learning of the Markov chains in our task. All of the Wve subjects questioned about their strategy identiWed most likely transitions from one reward location to another, indicating knowledge that they were guiding selections based on the previous outcome. However, it does not appear any of the subjects realized that only the reward location on the previous trial mattered. Indeed, some subjects indicated variations in their strategy based on the previous two trials (for example one subject would select unlikely reward probability on the next trial, having just viewed an unlikely transition in reward locations).
Results from the varying-reward sessions indicate that humans combine reward probabilities from a Markov chain with reward magnitude in order to increase their accumulated reward. This was most clearly demonstrated on trials in which subjects sacriWced the greatest reward probability and the greatest reward magnitude in order to select a stimulus that had the greatest expected value. The ability to combine reward probability and magnitude to calculate expected value requires a quantitative, rather than just qualitative (for example, rank ordering), representation of these values. Whereas subjects were given an accurate quantitative description of the reward magnitudes at the start of each session, subjects were not informed about reward probability-these quantities must have been learned from the Markov chain.
In our Markov task, manipulating reward probability did not have a consistent eVect on saccade reaction times, which are typically used as an indication of the degree of saccade preparation (e.g. Carpenter and Williams 1995; Dorris and Munoz 1998) . This is presumably because our human subjects were able to plan for their next selection as soon as feedback was provided at the end of the previous trial. We expect that manipulating target probabilities conditioned on a Markov state would have inXuenced saccade reaction time if presented as a reaction time task, as has been done for manual selections (Kornblum 1968 (Kornblum , 1969 .
The use of Markov chains provides an additional tool for manipulating probabilities for the purpose of understanding target selections. Although there is an explicit component to the learning that could presumably be used to guide selections by any type of response (e.g. manual selections), we have focused on saccadic eye movements, which have been extensively studied with regard to target selection (Schall and Thompson 1999) . Our current Markov task, used to demonstrate learning, is most similar to free choice experiments used to demonstrate neural correlates of subjective valuation or reward probability in the lateral intraparietal area (Platt and Glimcher 1999; Sugrue et al. 2004; Dorris and Glimcher 2004; Yang and Shadlen 2007) and prefrontal cortex (Barraclough et al. 2004 ). However, Markov chains could be easily adapted to a reaction time task in which the Markov state would determine target probability. The use of a Markov chain would avoid confounds with target repetitions or changes in the visual scene. Some recent Mean fraction of selections by a reward probability, b reward magnitude, and c rank-ordered expected value, for all Markov states. Mean fraction of selections by d reward probability, e reward magnitude, and f rank-ordered expected value for only the Markov state in which the stimulus with greatest expected value had neither the greatest reward probability nor the greatest reward magnitude. All plots are from a sample of 18 sessions, three for each of six subjects, error bars are standard error of the mean A B C D E F studies have dynamically manipulated probabilities by using symbolic cues that indicate the probability of an outcome, such as the weather prediction task (Gluck et al. 2002) , which has recently been applied to non-human primates (Yang and Shadlen 2007) . The use of probabilistic cues is an eVective way to manipulate target probability, although the learning of the cues can take time, especially in non-human primates. In contrast, Markov chains provide a rich statistical structure that has relevance in modeling animal behavior and is quickly utilized by naïve human subjects.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that human subjects can learn about the statistics of a Markov chain from a saccade selection task. Naïve subjects select stimuli at a frequency close to reward probability and do so within ten trials. If informed of the Markovian structure, subjects approach a strategy that maximizes reward over hundreds of trials. In addition, humans incorporate reward magnitude into their selection process in order to select stimuli with greater expected values. Using a Markov chain to manipulate probabilities could provide a powerful tool for further study into how the brain makes use of probabilities and expected value in order to inXuence saccade target selection.
